Abstract-The last 10 years have seen the rise of new NVM technologies as alternative solutions to Flash technology, which is facing downsizing issues. Apart from offering higher performance than the state of the art of Flash, one of their key features is lower power consumption, which makes them even more suitable for the IoT era. But one of the other main concerns regarding IoT is data security, which is yet to be evaluated for emerging NVM. Our previous work aimed at putting under test the integrity of HfO 2 based resistive RAM (OxRAM cells). Bit-set occurrences were found after thermal laser attacks. This present work investigates the difference in behaviour when a selector is added to the resistive element, thanks to attack on different stacks. The results obtained give interesting tracks for the design of secure OxRAM-based ICs. It also studies the kinetic role of temperature through heating experiments.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Non-Volatile Memories Issues
Technologies such as Magnetic RAM (MRAM), Resistive RAM or Phase Change RAM (PCRAM) have emerged on the NVM market as possible replacements for Flash technology. Also, considering the demand for low power consumption in the upcoming IoT era, they represent serious solutions for embedded memories in smart objects. Indeed, they fit such requirements in term of cost and especially power consumption. Nonetheless, given that billions of devices containing private data will be interacting between each other in the years to come, security is also an aspect that must not be neglected.
While Flash technology is considered secured, emerging NVM integrity has not been investigated neither under UV nor laser attacks such as in [1] or [2] . This is the reason why this work is leaning on one of this technologies security issues, which is oxide-based RRAM (OxRAM).
B. OxRAM Technology Description
A 1R OxRAM cell is made of two metal electrodes with a transition metal oxide (TMO) in-between. For a better control of the current flowing through the cell, a transistor can also be added to form a 1T1R structure (as pictured on Fig. 1 ). Due to its small size,1R architecture is, like standalone Flash, better suited for mass storage applications. As for 1T1R structure, considering its higher reliability and performances compared to 1R cells, they can be seen as an alternative option to embedded Flash. Data storage in OxRAM cells relies on resistance switching through redox reactions. When a voltage is applied to the top electrode in order to set a cell in a high resistive state (HRS), oxygen ions migrate from the oxide to the electrode [3] . When the set voltage V set is reached, a conductive filament (CF) of oxygen vacancies is created. It enables current to flow throughout the oxide (as noticed on Fig. 2 ). During this operation, the current must be limited to a compliance current I c , in order to avoid an overshoot on the cell that might drive the oxide towards a non-reversible very low resistance state. This current can be adjusted with either the measurement instrument for 1R cells or gate voltage value of the transistor for 1T1R cells.
On the contrary, if the cell is in a low resistive state (LRS), applying a voltage will make oxygen ions move back to the oxide, which is called reset. At the reset voltage (V Reset ) and reset current (I Reset ), ions begin to fill the vacancies, cut the current path, and the cell retrieve its HRS state. 
C. Previous Results on OxRAM Cells
In our previous work presented in [4] , 1R OxRAM cells made of a 5nm-thick HfO 2 layer and 10nm-thick Ti and TiN electrodes (as described in [5] ) have been attacked with a Nd:YAG laser pulse. A bit-set effect has been observed on HRS-state cells (see Fig. 3 ), and was not influenced by the wavelengths used for the attack (i.e 355 nm and 1064 nm). Also, their cycling behaviour remain unchanged after the laser shot, pointing out that only data has been modified. Simulations allowed to correlate the laser influence with local temperature which reaches about 610 K at peak during the attack.
This results can also be expected on 1T1R cells, since the structure difference only impacts the compliance current management. However they are yet to be observed. Moreover, even though the temperature has been suspected for laser switching, a kinetic aspect of the heating process is not excluded. This can be verified with, for example, a much slower heating of the cells.
The following section of this paper will then be dedicated to laser attacks on 1T1R OxRAM cells. Section 3 will be focused on the effect of an oven heating of the 1R cells mentionned above, to avoid any influence from the transistor on the results.
II. LASER ATTACK ON 1T1R OXRAM CELLS
This section is focused on the switching effect occurring for HRS cells when attacked. Hence, the goal of the following experiment is to check if a change in the cell architecture impacts the qualitative aspect of the laser switching process.
A. Experimental Setup
The laser equipment used for this experiment embeds a Nd:YAG source whose wavelength is 1064 nm. The pulse has a 5μm-spot size , and a surface power up to 0,09 W.m −2 , with a duration that can be defined starting at 50 ns (value chosen for the following attacks). Regarding the OxRAM cells, the resistive element of the 1T1R cells is different compared to the one used in our previous work, since the oxide thickness has changed from 5 nm to 10 nm. The gate width and length of the . Moreover, the experiment is conducted with a cell layout (presented in Fig. 4 ) that prevents the transistor from being affected by the pulse, given the size of the spot and the distance to the 1R stack.
The electrical characterisations of the 14 HRS cells before attack consist in a quasistatic Forming operation, then two pulsed Reset/Set cycles and a pulsed Reset operation. Each operation is followed by a pulsed read of the cell state. Once the cells have been exposed to the laser, another read operation is performed as well as new pulsed Reset/Set cycles. The voltage values for each pulsed operation are given in Table I .
B. Results
B.1 Cells Resistances Values After Attack
As observed on Fig. 5 , all the 14 cells under attack (HRS state) exhibit lower resistance values after the laser shot, which is consistent with previous results. There are especially 5 of these cells whose resistance is lower than the average resistance value after an electrical set, which means they switched to the LRS. However, the laser set is only reversible for one of them, since 4 cells are non-functionall (i.e they cannot be reset electrically after the laser pulse). They correspond to the lowest resistance values after attack of the sample. The reason why this change in architecture modifies the behaviour of these cells after attack must be investigated. We will focus on these cells that failed to reset in section B.2 . Table II ) are close to the ones observed for attacks on 1R cells (880 Ω average [4] ). But contrary to 1T1R cells, 1R cells could be reset after the attack. One possible reason for this difference is that the reset current is not important enough to fill the vacancies of the oxide for 1T1R cells. This may be consistentl since this one is similar to the compliance current [6] , and provided that I c = 100 μA for 1T1R cells while I c = 1 mA for 1R cells.
In order to confirm or not this hypothesis, new electrical reset operations have been performed on the four 1T1R cells that failed to reset after the attack. But this time, the gate voltage V g (which controls I c and thus I Reset ) has been increased starting at the standard value (2.5 V). This may be able to reset the cells but to overload the transistor as well.
As seen on Table II the two cells with the highest resistance values were succesfully reset at V g = 3.2 V. The other ones switched to the HRS at V g = 3.5 V . Aside from making the 4 concerned cells fonctionnal, this confirms our first hypothesis. This also nuances the observations made on 1R cells regarding the cell behaviour after a laser shot.
C. Implications on OxRAM design for security applications
The results of the previous section are very interesting from a security point of view. Indeed, by lowering the compliance cur- The box extends from the lower to upper quartile values of the data, with a line at the median rent of the cell, the LRS resistance value is increased [7] and the reset current reduced, which means a very low resistive state might not be reversed, thus making the attack detectable.This is pictured on Fig. 6 , which highlights the dependency between R LRS and I c , since a gain of a decade in resistance corresponds to a loss of about a decade in compliance current. As a consequence, working with a low compliance current, apart from being a solution to improve the consumption of low power devices, is also to take into consideration for the design of secure OxRAM-based ICs.
There are two ways to lessen the compliance current value in OxRAM cells. The first is the most obvious one, which is to reduce the gate voltage value V g , since it lowers the drain current as well, and therefore the compliance current and reset current of the cell (since the cell is connected to the drain as pictured in Fig. 1 ), as noticed on Fig. 6 .
The other method consists in reducing the transistor gate size, which has a direct influence on the compliance current. In our case, regular cycling performed on devices with different values of W pointed out that dividing the gate width by a decade allows to lower the compliance from the same amount. This method appears to be safer since one cannot modify the size of the transistor while the gate voltage can be changed.
D. Conclusion
As expected, a bit set effect has been obtained on about 40% of the targeted 1T1R cells. Nonetheless, the resistance of a cell after attack is lower than the resistance obtained after an electrical set. In other words, the CF created is bigger during a laser attack than it is while the cell is cycled. As a consequence, a higher value of I reset (and thus I c ) is required to reset the cell. Therefore, the use of a low compliance current, provided by a smaller gate of the transistor, seems to be an interesting track for a countermeasure against this kind of attack, since it would allow to detect the creation of a large conductive filament within the oxide of the cell.
III. HIGH TEMPERATURE OVEN HEATING
Our previous work has shown that a laser pulse could impact the cells independently from the wavelength used. We also demonstrated that as the metallization layer above the resistive element absorbs all the induced photons (transmission coefficient ≈ 10 −15 for λ = 1064 nm and about 10 −24 for λ = 355 nm), temperature only is responsible for the bit-set effect on HRS cells. Which is consistent with the results of the laser heating and electrical set models that were implemented [4] .
While a laser attack provides a brutal heating to the device, a slow increase of the temperature might not have the same effect. The goal here is thus to observe what could happen if a gradual rise of the temperature (i.e with an oven heating) was performed on the cells.
A. Experimental Setup
In order to avoid any influence from the transistor on the results, this experiment has been conducted on 1R cells. These OxRAM devices are the same 1R cells that were studied in [4] . 16 HRS and 16 LRS cells have been characterised before (few set/reset cycles) and after being heated at a temperature T. The chosen temperatures for the experiment are T Heat1 = 520 K and T Heat2 = 570 K. Several read operations have been performed on the cells to monitor their resistance value. The total time the devices spent in the oven is about a week.
B. Heating Results
As represented on Fig. 7 , an important variation of the resistance values can be highlighted on all HRS cells at both temperatures. At T Heat1 , both HRS and LRS are stable until three hours. The average HRS resistance value is highly impacted afterwards since it changes from 13 kΩ to 4 kΩ, though the cells are not switching to the LRS. The LRS average resistance level is also slightly decreasing. This is something that had been unnoticed for laser attacks.
This tendency is even more visible by looking at the curves for T=T Heat2 . After being stable for about 20 minutes, all the HRS cells have switched to the LRS. In addition, the decay in LRS resistance average value is getting more important as it varies from 500 Ω to 180 Ω. Another important result is that both HRS and LRS states are merging towards the same resistance level R Heat2 = 180 Ω . However, given the low value obtained, none of these cells could be reset (with standard parameters) afterwards with I c = 1 mA.
The effects obtained on the cells are consistent with the simulated laser temperature mentionned in Section 1, but they discard the hypothesis of a kinetic-driven process. However, the LRS of all cells has also been impacted, while it was not the case during laser experiments. This implies that a higher laser surface power might have influenced the devices in a similar way.
C. Improving Thermal Laser Attacks
This results also give a track for a possible imporvement of the attack performed in Section II. Indeed, one can remark that the cells are being set progressively. Hence, lessening the oven time would have left the cells in a higher state. The same observation can be made for the temperature, since for an equal baking duration, the higher the temperature, the lower the resistance value. This reasoning could also be applied to a laser pulse.
As a result, in the best case scenario for an attacker, this means that an accurate control of the duration and the surface power of the laser pulse (which is correlated with the heating temperature) could leave a cell in any desired state below the HRS. If the control of the resistance value after attack can be achieved, the countermeasure presented at the end of Section II would be invalidated.
IV. CONCLUSION
It has already been shown that a laser attack could set an OxRAM cell. However, while 1R cells were still functional afterwards, some 1T1R cells could not be reset since the reset current was not sufficient to switch the cells back to the HRS. This has been explained by the use of a lower compliance current for 1T1R cells compared to 1R cells. Hence, working at a low compliance current can be seen as a countermeasure to laser attacks, and can be achieved by either lowering the gate voltage or reducing the size of the gate.
A heating experiment also allowed to confirm the results of thermal and electrical simulations, that were performed in a previous work, regarding the laser set temperature. It also rejects the possibility of a set induced by a brutal heating exclusively. In other words temperature only is able to make the ions migrate from the oxide to the top electrode of an OxRAM stack. This progessive switch of the oxide state can be exploited to improve the laser attack which could lead to a control of the resistance value after attack, which can bypass the previously found countermeasure.
